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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
DALE DEMONT HARDY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010396-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take 
an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree 
or capital felony. Appellant Dale Hardy was convicted in two separate cases of violating 
a protective order. The conviction in the first case, Case No. 991200131 ("Case No. 
131"), is recorded as a class A misdemeanor offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 
(1999). The convictions in the second case, Case No. 991200873 ("Case No. 873"), are 
recorded as two third degree felony offenses under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999). 
The Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Third Judicial District Court, entered judgment in the 
cases. A copy of each judgment is contained in the attached Addendum A.1 
Case Nos. 131 and 873 were consolidated by order of this Court for purposes of 
the appeal. A copy of the consolidation order is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
1 At times, other judges were involved in each matter, including the Honorable William 
A. Thome (see Case No. 131:14), and Judge Michael Burton. (See Case No. 873:177; 
Case No. 131:30-31.) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the state presented legally sufficient 
evidence, either to support a violation of the plea in abeyance or the new violations of the 
protective order for the convictions in each case. The statutes applicable to the issue are 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-108 (1999); 77-36-1 (1999); and 30-6-1 el seq. (1998). 
Standard of Review: The first issue concerns statutory construction, which is 
reviewed for correctness, State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996), and the 
sufficiency of the evidence, which is reviewed as follows: 
We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a matter of 
law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction. State v. Harman, 767 
P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989). Nevertheless, "the standard for reversal is high.1' 
Id. We will reverse only if the evidence is so "'inconclusive or inherently impro-
bable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime.'" Id (quoting State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983)); accord State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985). We review 
from a perspective most favorable to the verdict the evidence and all inferences 
reasonably drawn from the evidence, recognizing that determinations regarding 
witness credibility are solely within the jury's province. Harman, 767 P.2d at 568. 
State v. Smith. 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
2. Whether Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and 76-5-108 (1999), which 
prohibit direct/indirect contact/communication, are overly broad, both facially and as 
applied, and vague in violation of the federal constitution. 
Standard of Review: The second issue is a question of law, which this Court will 
review for correctness without deference to the trial court. Provo City v. Whatcott 2000 
2 
UTApp 86^5, 1 P.3d 1113: State v. Morrison. 2001 UT 73,^5, 31 P.3d547. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Hardy challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in Case No. 131 at 93:24-29, and 
the constitutionality of statutory provisions and the protective order at 70-73. See also 
Case No. 873 at 178:135-42. Hardy made the same constitutional challenges and argued 
insufficient evidence in Case No. 873 at 159-161, and 178:135-142. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions will be determinative of the 
issues on appeal: Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 through 30-6-4.2 (1998); and U.S. Const, amends. I, & XIV, 
sec. 1. The text of those provisions is contained in the attached Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASES 
Nature of the Cases, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
Case No. 991200131.2 
In January 1999, Courtney Hardy, the defendant's estranged wife, obtained a pro-
tective order against him. On January 27, 1999, the state charged Hardy with violating 
2 The pleadings in each case have been separately numbered beginning with page 1 to 
page 87 in Case No. 131, and page 1 to page 176 in Case No. 873. To avoid confusion in 
referring to the separate pleadings for each case, Hardy will identify pleadings by 
referring first to the abbreviated trial court case number as indicated above (Case No. 
991200131 is abbreviated as "Case No. 131," and Case No. 991299873 is abbreviated as 
"Case No. 873"), followed by the page number designated as the record on appeal. For 
example, Hardy will refer to page one of the pleadings in the case ending in "131" as 
follows: (Case No. 131:1). 
3 
the order. (Case No. 131:1-2.) On April 6, 1999, Hardy entered into an agreement with 
the state for a plea in abeyance. Hardy agreed to abstain from violating the order for a 
period of a year; at the end of the year if Hardy was successful, the trial court would enter 
a "not guilty" plea in the matter and dismiss the case. (Case No. 131:8-12.) 
On July 12, 2000, the trial court found Hardy in violation of the protective order, 
and thus, the terms of the plea in abeyance. Based on that finding, the court entered the 
guilty plea in Case No. 131 for the original violation in the matter, and bound Hardy over 
on the charges for the new violations. (Case No. 131:50) 
In August 2000, a trial was held on the charges for the new violations. (See Case 
No. 873 at 178). During trial, counsel for Hardy argued insufficient evidence to support a 
violation of the plea agreement, and insufficient evidence to support the new charges for 
violations of the protective order. (Id at 178:135-142.) Counsel for Hardy also 
challenged the constitutionality of the relevant statutory provisions governing the matter. 
The trial court rejected Hardy's arguments. (Id.) 
On March 13, 2001, the trial judge ordered Hardy to serve 365 days in jail for the 
violation in Case No. 131. On March 23, 2001, the defense filed a motion to amend 
judgment, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed. (Case No. 131:67-74.) 
Case No. 991200873. 
In July 1999, the state filed an information against Hardy that was later amended to 
allege seven counts of violating a protective order. (Case No. 873:1-3, 51-56.) Accor-
4 
ding to the amended information, the violations occurred between January 21, 1999, and 
June 1999. (Id.) On August 31,2000, the trial court commenced a jury trial in the case. 
(Case No. 873 at 178.) At the conclusion of the state's case in chief, counsel for Hardy 
asked the court to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence and he challenged the 
constitutionality of the statutes and the protective order governing the matter. (Case No. 
873 at 178:135-142.) The court denied the motions. (Id.) Thereafter, the jury rendered a 
verdict in the mater and acquitted Hardy on counts I through V and found him guilty on 
counts VI and VII. (Case No. 873:121-37.) 
On March 13, 2001, the trial court ordered Hardy to serve indeterminate prison 
terms of up to five years at the Utah State Prison for the offenses (Case No. 873:156-57), 
and on March 23, 2001, the defense filed a motion again asking the court to declare the 
relevant statutory provisions and protective order unconstitutional (Case No. 873:159-61). 
The trial court denied the motion (Case No. 873:162), and this appeal followed. This case 
has been consolidated with Case No. 131. (See Addendum B, hereto.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Courtney and Dale Hardy were married on June 30, 1990. (Case No. 873 at 
178:80.) They had four children together: Breque, who was bom in May 1991; Miquelle, 
who was bom in May 1993; Brighton, who was born in February 1996; and Serena, who 
was born in January 1998. (WL at 178:84-85.) 
On January 8, 1999, Courtney Hardy obtained an ex parte protective order against 
5 
Dale Hardy; and on January 25, the trial court entered a permanent order in the matter. 
(Case No. 873 at 178:80-83.) A copy of the permanent protective order is attached 
hereto as Addendum D. The judge initialed each paragraph in the permanent protective 
order that is identified with an ff[x],M as follows: 
The Court having reviewed Petitioner's Verified Petition for Protective Order and: 
[having received argument and evidence,] and it appearing that domestic violence 
or abuse has occurred, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
(The Judge or Commissioner shall initial 
each section that is included in this Order.) 
[x] 1. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to 
commit domestic violence or abuse against Petitioner. 
* * * 
[x] 3. The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, 
harassing, telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner, 
[x] 4. The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay away, from 
Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at: 7772 South Brighton Way, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84121, and Respondent is prohibited from terminating or 
interfering with the utility services to the residence. 
* * * 
[x] 7. The Petitioner is awarded temporary possession of the following residence, 
automobile and/or other essential personal property: 7772 South Brighton Way, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121; green 1993 Chevy Suburban 4x4; and, all personal 
property belonging to Petitioner and/or the parties' minor child/ren. This award is 
subject to orders concerning the listed property in future domestic proceedings. 
* * * 
[x] 9. An officer from the same law enforcement agency shall facilitate 
Respondent's removal of Respondent's essential personal belongings from the 
parties' residence. The law enforcement officer shall contact Petitioner to make 
these arrangements. Respondent may not contact the Petitioner or enter the 
residence to obtain any items. 
* * * 
Petitioner is granted the following temporary relief (provisions "a" through "1") 
which will (expire/be reviewed by the court) 150 days from the date of this order: 
[x] a. The Petitioner is granted temporary custody of the following minor children: 
6 
Breque (age 7), Miquelle (age 5), Brighton (age 3), & Serena (age 1) HARDY, 
[x] b. Visitation shall be [standard schedule under] U.C.A. §§ 30-3-35 & 35.5. 
[x] c. The Respondent is restrained from using drugs and/or alcohol prior to or 
during visitation. 
[x] d. The Respondent is restrained from removing the parties' minor children 
from the state of Utah. 
(Case No. 873:178, Exhibit P2.)3 
On January 8, 1999, Deputy Vic Siebeneck served the initial ex parte order on 
Hardy at the family's home on Brighton Way in Salt Lake County. (Case No. 873 at 
178:64-65.) At the time of service, Siebeneck discussed paragraph 3 of the order with 
Hardy and informed him "that he could not directly or indirectly, letters, third party, he 
could not in any way, shape, or form any contact with the petitioner, in this case Ms. 
Hardy. And I did - and I did advise him that includes, you know, hanging out in front of 
the house or watching the girl work or, you know, writing letters and stuff like that. And 
phone - and phone calls." (IdL at 178:67-68.) 
Siebeneck then allowed Hardy to retrieve some personal items and he escorted 
Hardy from the residence. (Case No. 873 at 178:71-72.) According to Siebeneck, Hardy 
was "surprised" and "taken aback" at being ordered out of the home. Nevertheless, he 
was cooperative and peaceful during the process. (IdL at 178:69-72.) 
On January 9, Siebeneck again told Hardy that "he could have no contact directly, 
indirectly, through third party, letters, phone calls, in any way. No communication with 
3 All references to exhibits in this matter are to those exhibits that were admitted into 
evidence at trial in Case No. 873, and are contained in the exhibit envelope on appeal. 
7 
[Courtney] whatsoever." (Case No. 873 at 178:69.) 
Thereafter, the state filed 7 counts against Hardy, claiming he violated the order in 
several respects. The jury convicted Hardy on counts VI and VII based on the following: 
On or about June 7, 1999, Courtney retrieved a letter from the mailbox addressed 
to the children at their home on Brighton Way. The letter was from Hardy. (Case No. 
873 at 178:111.) The letter talked about Courtney and Hardy's feelings for her, including 
feelings of sorrow, remorse and devotion. (Id. at 178:111-13; Exhibit P10.) The letter 
also included a recipe for "stuffed silver rainbow trout." (Case No. 873 at 178:114; 
Exhibit P10.) A copy of the June 7 letter and recipe are attached hereto as Addendum E. 
Courtney testified that on June 7, 1999, her children could not read and would not have 
understood the letter, and they did not cook. (Case No. 873 at 178:113-114.) 
Next, on June 24, 1999, Courtney again retrieved a letter from the mailbox 
addressed to the children at their home on Brighton Way from Hardy. (Case No. 873 at 
178:114-115.) Again, among other things, the letter talked about Courtney and Hardy's 
feelings for her, including feelings of sorrow, remorse and devotion. (Id. at 178:114-117; 
Exhibit PI 1.) Courtney testified that the envelope also contained a card for her father 
with a note that stated, "please forward." (Id at 178:117-18; Exhibit P12.) A copy of the 
June 24 letter and card are attached hereto as Addendum F. 
Courtney and Hardy were divorced in May 2000. (Case No. 873 at 178:80.) 
After the jury found Hardy guilty on counts VI and VII, the judge ordered him to 
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serve a jail sentence for the misdemeanor conviction in Case No. 991200131, and 
indeterminate terms of up to five years at the Utah State Prison for the felony convictions 
in Case No. 991200873. (Case No. 873:156-57; Case No. 131:67; see also Case No. 873 
at 179:16-17; Case No. 131 at 94:16-17.) 
Hardy is incarcerated. He is appealing from the final order in each case. 
Additional facts relating to this appeal are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A "petitioner" may obtain a protective order in civil court against a "respondent" 
upon proof of domestic violence or abuse. Petitioner Courtney Hardy obtained a protec-
tive order against Hardy in January 1999. According to the protective order and Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) Hardy was prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting 
or otherwise communicating with Courtney. In June 1999, Hardy wrote two letters to his 
children, ages 8, 6, 3, and 1. Hardy expressed his feelings for Courtney in the letters and 
he expressed remorse, sorrow, and devotion. Courtney testified that the children were too 
young at the time to understand the letters. Based on that evidence, Hardy was convicted 
of indirectly/directly contacting or otherwise communicating with Courtney. 
Hardy is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. 
Specifically, the state failed to prove that the letters were for Courtney; that Courtney 
believed the letters were for her; that the letters contained information for Courtney's 
benefit; or that Hardy was somehow using the children to communicate with Courtney. 
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The evidence failed to show a direct/indirect communication/contact with Courtney. In 
addition, the letters do not contain criminal content. That is, they are not violent, 
threatening, harmful, abusive, or harassing. Thus, the convictions must be reversed. 
Hardy also is challenging the constitutionality of the statutory provisions appli-
cable in this matter. Section 30-6-4.2(2)(b) makes it a crime for a respondent to directly 
or indirectly contact or otherwise communicate with a petitioner. The statute fails to 
define the italicized terms and it fails to otherwise limit application of the provision. 
Thus, it serves to embrace and criminalize innocent, non-criminal conduct. Because the 
statute sweeps within its ambit "a potentially huge universe of otherwise legitimate" 
conduct, Whatcott 2000 UT App 86,1J11, it cannot be upheld. It must be stricken as 
vague, ambiguous and overly broad under the federal constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HARDY 
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTACTED OR OTHERWISE 
COMMUNICATED WITH COURTNEY IN VIOLATION OF THE 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS. 
Hardy was charged with violating a protective order under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
108. (Case No. 873:51-56.) Evidence relating to the charges prompted the trial judge to 
withdraw Hardy's plea in abeyance in Case No. 131 and enter a guilty plea against him 
for a misdemeanor offense. Hardy also was convicted by a jury of two counts of 
violating the order in Case No. 873. Hardy maintains the evidence was insufficient to 
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support the convictions in Case No. 873, and the entry of a guilty plea in Case No. 131. 
f,We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a matter of 
law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." State v. Smith, 927 
P.2d 649,651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)). The defendant must overcome a heavy burden in 
challenging the sufficiency of evidence for a jury verdict. See id; State v. Vessey, 
967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "We view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the jury verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and 
"will reverse only if the evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime.'" Smith, 927 P.2d at 651 (quoting Harman, 767 P.2d at 568 
(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983))). However, though the 
burden is high, it is not impossible. See id. "We will not make speculative leaps 
across gaps in the evidence." Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
"Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Barman, 161 P.2d at 568. "To affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure the State 
has introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." 
S/mY/z,927P.2dat651. 
State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136,1fl0, 2 P.3d 954; see also State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 
74,1[18, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Leleae. 1999 UT App 368,1J17, 993 P.2d 232. 
To prevail on a claim of insufficient evidence, the defendant '"must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict."' State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, [^13, 
25 P.3d 985 (citing State v. Hopkins. 1999 UT 98, fl4, 989 P.2d 1065).4 
4 In Case No. 131, the state was required to prove under the "preponderance of the 
evidence" standard that Hardy violated the protective order. The sufficiency challenge 
under that standard is similar to the standard above: appellant must "marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it 
in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings;' Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
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In the event the evidence is contradictory or conflicting, so long as a reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence supports each element, this Court will not disturb the 
verdict, or in Case No. 131, the trial court's findings. See Boyd, 2001 UT 30, Tf 14. 
[W]e do not sit as a second trier of fact: llfIt is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.1 So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all 
the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." 
Id at Tf 16 (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. 
Lamm. 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980))); see also State v. Cravens. 2000 UT App 344, 
1J18, 15 P.3d 635; State v. Chanev. 1999 UT App 309, ^ |30, 989 P.2d 1091 (nWe may not 
weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, but instead 'assume that the jury believed the 
evidence and inferences that support the verdict1"); State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 784 
(Utah 1991) (the mere existence of conflicting evidence does not warrant reversal). 
Also, it is well settled that "a conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial 
evidence.1' State v. Lvman. 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997)). '"Circumstantial evidence need not be regarded 
as inferior evidence if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient to sustain a conviction.'" Lyman. 966 
P.2d at 281 (quoting State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1986)): see State v. Span. 
819 P.2d 329, 332-33 (Utah 1991). This Court will determine whether '"the inferences 
that can be drawn from th[e] evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human 
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experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt."* Brown. 948 P.2d at 344. 
In accordance with the standards identified above, it is the function of a reviewing 
court to ensure "that there is sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the 
charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed 
the crime." State v. Merila. 966 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (cite omitted). 
In this matter, the state failed to present evidence sufficient to establish the 
violations of the protective order. As set forth below, the convictions must be reversed. 
A. THE RELEVANT STATUTES AND PROTECTIVE ORDER DO NOT 
PROHIBIT HARDY FROM WRITING TO HIS CHILDREN. 
(1) Under the Sufficiency of the Evidence Analysis, this Court Will Begin by 
Construing the Statutory Provisions at Issue. 
In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, it is proper to identify the elements 
that make up the offense. See State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1215 (Utah 1993); Merila. 
966 P.2d at 272; Smith. 927 P.2d at 651 ("We begin our [sufficiency] review by setting 
out the elements of the crime"); State v. Singh. 819 P.2d 356, 358-59 (Utah App. 1991); 
U.S. v. Cicco. 10 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1993) (in considering the sufficiency of the 
evidence, "[w]e will utilize the traditional tools of statutory construction in order to 
determine what conduct constitutes a violation of [the criminal statute]"); U.S. v. Hollis. 
971 F.2d 1441, 1447-49 (10th Cir. 1992) (court considers meaning of each element), cert. 
denied. 507 U.S. 985 (1993); U.S. v. Levine. 41 F.3d 607, 610-11 (10th Cir. 1994) 
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(sufficiency of the evidence analysis necessarily includes engaging in statutory 
construction to determine elements of the offense). 
To that end, this Court is "guided by the rule that a statute should generally be 
construed according to its plain language." Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 
(Utah 1989); State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53-54 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Allred v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd.. 914 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); BB & B Transp. v. 
Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 893 P.2d 611,614 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
The statutory provisions at issue in this case are Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 et 
seq.; 76-5-108; and 77-36-1. Section 30-6-2 provides the following: 
(1) Any cohabitant or any child residing with a cohabitant who has been subjected 
to abuse or domestic violence, or to whom there is a substantial likelihood of 
immediate danger of abuse or domestic violence, may seek an ex parte protective 
order or a protective order in accordance with this chapter, whether or not that 
person has left the residence or the premises in an effort to avoid further abuse. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-2 (1998); see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(l)(a). Also, 
(2) A court may grant the following relief without notice in an order for 
protection or a modification issued ex parte: 
(a) enjoin the respondent from threatening to commit or committing domestic 
violence or abuse against the petitioner and any designated family or household 
member; 
(b) prohibit the respondent from harassing, telephoning, contacting, or otherwise 
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; 
(c) order that the respondent is excluded from the petitionees residence and its 
premises, and order the respondent to stay away from the residence, school, or 
place of employment of the petitioner, and the premises of any of these, or any 
specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or 
household member; 
(d) upon finding that the respondent's use or possession of a weapon may pose a 
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serious threat of harm to the petitioner, prohibit the respondent from purchasing, 
using, or possessing a firearm or other weapon specified by the court; 
(e) order possession and use of an automobile and other essential personal 
effects, and direct the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the peti-
tioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored 
to possession of the residence, automobile, and other essential personal effects, or 
to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal belongings[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2 (1998). According to §§ 76-5-108 and 30-6-4.2(5)(a)(i), an 
intentional/knowing violation of the above provisions constitutes a crime. 
Related statutes define terms used in the above provisions, including the terms 
"abuse," "domestic violence," and "harassment." See Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1(1) 
("abuse" is defined as attempting to cause or causing physical harm or placing another in 
fear of imminent harm); Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1 ("domestic violence" is defined as 
any criminal offense involving violence or physical harm or threats, or any attempt, 
conspiracy, or solicitation to commit such act; statute lists specific crimes of violence 
constituting "domestic violence"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106 ("harassment" is defined 
as follows: "A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to frighten or harass another, 
he communicates a written or recorded threat to commit any violent felony"); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-108. Additional, relevant terms are not defined under the statutes. 
(2) The State Charged Hardy with nContacting'1 or "Otherwise Communicating1' 
with Courtney. Those Terms Are Not Defined in the Relevant Statutory Provisions. 
In this matter, the state argued that Hardy violated the protective order and 
statutory provisions by contacting or otherwise communicating with Courtney, directly or 
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indirectly. (Case No. 873 at 178:54-55, 84, 187, 192-94; Case No. 131 at 93:9, 22-24, 
27.) That conduct is proscribed by Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.2(2)(b) (stating that 
"respondent" is "prohibited]" from "harassing, telephoning, contacting, or otherwise 
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly").5 
The relevant statutory provisions fail to define the terms direct, indirect, contact, 
or communicate. Consequently, this Court will look to the dictionary to define those 
terms. See State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, \\ 1, 992 P.2d 986 (this court relies on dictionary 
definitions to determine plain meaning). 
According to the dictionary, the term "direct" means "with nothing or no one 
between; immediate; close, firsthand, or personal"; while the term "indirect" means "not 
direct; specifically, a) not straight; deviating; roundabout b) not straight to the point, or to 
the person or thing aimed at [an indirect reply] c) not straightforward; not fair and open; 
dishonest [indirect dealing] d) not immediate; secondary [an indirect result]." Webster's 
New World College Dictionary 407, 727 (4 ed. 1999). 
Next, the term "communicate" is defined as follows: "1. to pass along; impart; 
transmit (as heat, motion, or a disease) 2. to make known; give (information, signals, or 
messages)." Also, it means "to give or exchange information, signals, or messages in any 
5 There is no evidence to support, and the state did not argue, that Hardy violated Section 
30-6-4.2(2)(b) by "telephoning" or "harassing" Courtney. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
106 (1999) (defining harassment as an "intent to frighten or harass another" by com-
municating a "written or recorded threat to commit any violent felony"); (see also Case 
No. 873 at 178; and Case No. 131 at 93). 
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way, as by talk, gestures, or writing/' Webster's New World College Dictionary 295 (4th 
ed. 1999). The term "contact" means, "1. the act or state of touching or meeting [two 
surfaces in contact] 2. the state or fact of being in touch, communication, or association 
(with) [to come into contact with new ideas]." Id. at 313. 
Thus, a direct/indirect communication/contact may involve an immediate, close, 
firsthand association, meeting, or exchange of signals, messages, gestures or writings; or 
a roundabout, deviating, or secondhand association/exchange of signals/information/ges-
tures or writings. Given the imprecise definitions for the relevant terms, § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) 
must be further construed in accordance with its statutory purpose, and in harmony with 
other provisions, as set forth below. See infra Point I.A.(3). 
(3) Section 30-6-4.2(2)(b) Should Be Construed to Prohibit Violent, Abusive. 
Threatening or Harassing Contact and Communication. 
In this matter, the protective order provided Courtney with custody of the children 
while Hardy had supervised visitation rights. (Case No. 873, Exhibit P2.) Also, Hardy 
was not specifically precluded by the protective order or statutory provisions from 
associating with or writing letters to his children about his feelings, his relationships, and 
his regrets. (See generally, Case No. 873, Case No. 131, Exhibit P2.) In addition, 
according to Courtney, in connection with separation and divorce proceedings, the trial 
court ordered the parties to cooperate and work together to preserve the marital assets, 
including the house, a trust account, and other properties. (Case No. 873 at 178:127.) 
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Inasmuch as the parties were required to work together on some matters, and 
Hardy had rights and responsibilities relating to the children, Hardy's rights and obliga-
tions necessarily required some direct/indirect contact/communication with Courtney. 
See State v. Valenzona, 992 P.2d 718, 722 (Haw. 1999) (recognizing that responsibilities 
attendant to visitation require some contact between the parents). 
Thus, while the plain language of § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and the protective order seem to 
prohibit Hardy from all manner of contact or communication with Courtney, that is un-
reasonable. Indeed, reality dictates some contact /communication at least as it relates to 
the children. See Valenzona, 992 P.2d at 722. 
In that regard, Hardy urges this Court to construe §30-6-4.2(2)(b) to require a 
showing that the direct/indirect "contact" or "communication" at issue was threatening, 
harassing, violent or abusive, as those terms are defined by statutory law. (See Case No. 
873 at 178:139 (defense counsel argues that law may legitimately proscribe "fighting 
words, nuisances, problems of that nature").) 
Such an interpretation would be appropriate under the rules of statutory construc-
tion for several reasons. First, such an interpretation would avoid constitutional problems 
with the statute. See infra Point II, herein; see also State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, Tf6, 980 
P.2d 191 (court construes statute in favor of constitutionality); In the Interest of 
Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1985) (court interprets statute to avoid due 
process concerns); State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, [^10, 31 P.3d 528 (court avoids possible 
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constitutional problems in construing statute). Second, it would comport with the purpose 
of the statutory provisions, as recognized by this Court. Strollo v. Strollo. 828 P.2d 532, 
534-35 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (the Cohabitant Abuse Act serves to protect those "who are 
reasonably in fear of physical harm resulting from past conduct coupled with a present 
threat of future harm"). Inasmuch as the Cohabitant Abuse Act and protective order serve 
to protect petitioners who fear they may be physically harmed, it would be reasonable to 
construe § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) to require proof that the "contact" or "communication" at issue 
was threatening, violent, abusive, or engendered fear of violence or abuse to support a 
criminal conviction. 
Third, the interpretation urged by Hardy would bring the relevant portions of § 30-
6-4.2(2)(b) in harmony with other provisions. See Lvon v. Burton. 2000 UT 19, ^ 17, 5 
P.3d 616 (statute will be construed so that it is in harmony with other provisions). That is, 
if this Court were to construe § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) to proscribe violent, abusive, or threatening 
contact or communication, such an interpretation would be in harmony with § 30-6-4.2(1) 
(allowing for protective order where there is domestic violence and abuse); §30-6-
4.2(2)(a) and (d) (prohibiting threats of violence or abuse and possession of a weapon 
that may pose a serious threat of harm); § 30-6-2(1) (prohibiting abuse, domestic abuse, 
and conduct that constitutes an immediate danger of abuse or violence); §§ 30-6-1 and 
77-36-1 (defining abuse and domestic violence as physical harm, fear, threats, and crimes 
of violence); and § 76-1-105 (defining harassment as a threat of violence). 
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Finally, however the statutory provisions and protective order may be construed, 
they do not prohibit Hardy from otherwise communicating with his children. That is, 
they do not prohibit Hardy from writing letters to the children discussing his love, regrets 
and feelings for Courtney. In that regard, the evidence here does not constitute a 
violation of the protective order, as further explained. 
B. THE MARSHALED FACTS FAIL TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS. 
In the event this Court construes § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and the protective order to 
require a showing that the "contact1' or "communication1' was violent, threatening, 
abusive, or engendered fear to support a conviction, the evidence here was insufficient. 
By the prosecutor's own admissions, this case is not about abuse or violence. (See 
Case No. 873 at 178:53 (prosecutor assures jury this case is not about violence/abuse).) 
In addition, there is no evidence to support that the content of the letters to the children 
threatened, harassed (see § 76-5-106, defining harassment as a "threat to commit any 
violent felony"), or harmed Courtney, or caused her to feel fear or intimidation. (See Case 
No. 873 at 178; Case No. 131 at 93.) Thus, if this Court construes the relevant provision 
as requested above, see supra Point I.A.(3), the convictions cannot be sustained. 
In the event this Court declines to construe the statute as requested, Hardy 
maintains the relevant statutory provisions and protective order are unconstitutionally 
vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. See infra. Point II. In addition, the evidence is insuf-
ficient to support the convictions, as discussed below. See infra, Point I.B.(l), (2). 
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(1) Case No. 991200873 and the Two Felony Convictions. 
The state's argument that Hardy violated the protective order was based on the 
following theory: Hardy wrote letters addressed to his children that contained mature 
content. According to the state, because the children were ages 8, 6, 3, and 1 at the time 
of the alleged conduct, the letters really served as a communication (direct or indirect) to 
Courtney. The prosecutor asserted the following: 'The State will, through it's witnesses, 
demonstrate that though the address label says children, the real intended recipient of that 
communication was Courtney Hardy, not the children." (Case No. 873 at 178:56.) 
The marshaled evidence presented at trial consisted of the following: the civil 
court entered an ex parte protective order against Hardy and had it served on January 8, 
1999. (Case No. 873 at 178:64.) The order became permanent on January 25, 1999. (14 
at 178:83). The protective order prohibited Hardy from contacting or otherwise communi-
cating with Courtney, either directly or indirectly (id. at 178:67, 84; see also Exhibit P2), 
by letter, telephone, third party or "in any way, shape, or form." (Id. at 178:67-69.) 
On or about June 7, 1999, Hardy forwarded a letter to the "Courtney and Dale 
Hardy children" at their home on Brighton Way. It was addressed to the "dearest ones" 
and signed "yours eternally, your father Dale." (Case No. 873 at 178:111-12.) The 
prosecutor focused on the following language in the June 7 letter as violating the 
protective order: 
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That [inaudible] converse like mommy and I did all that I feel now that I attempted 
to get to know her. I felt she did not know me well enough but I always wanted 
her to. She seemed to have [too] much [to do] when I needed to talk or she was 
tired [when] I [thought] she would be willing to hear me. 
* * * 
I still believe that your mom would trust me and like me if she would converse 
with me. That is why I wanted her to go with me on the cruise. 
(Case No. 873 at 178:111-13; Exhibit PIO; the complete letter is contained in Addendum 
E, hereto.) The letter also stated, "It has been five months since mommy and I talked." "I 
would never try to talk her [Courtney] into something or change her mind. I am not that 
way, nor would I do that with you children." "I think I may have scared mommy when I 
said that these children are Heavenly Father's, not ours." "Only listen to good about 
others and never spread bad - this is contention and is not of God. I learned this too late 
as I always knew when to stop, yet sometimes I was too frustrated and unable to 
communicate that I just became contentious too." Also, 
I know too how she feels now by my threats to leave or [to] make her leave you 
children, and I do not deserve to see you again. I am so very sorry and will spend 
my life making it up to her and you some way. Please know that I was not aware 
of the pain I caused your mommy, but I now know by experience what she only 
imagined, because I never could have done that and I was very awful [] to have 
even made such remarks yet I thought she knew me better than she did/does. 
(Case No. 873, Exhibit PIO.) The envelope also contained a recipe for stuffed trout. 
Courtney testified that in June 1999, the children would not have understood 
portions of the letter and they did not cook. (Case No. 873 at 178:111-14.) 
On June 24, 1999, Courtney retrieved another letter from the mailbox at the 
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Brighton Way home addressed to the "Courtney and Dale Hardy children." (Case No. 
873 at 178:114-15.) The letter began, "Dear children" and was signed, "With all my love 
forever, daddy." (Id.) The prosecutor focused on the following excerpts from the June 24 
letter as violating the protective order: 
. . . I only wish that I knew what I had done to [have] you treat me this way . . . 
* * * 
I remember how hurt I felt when mommy stayed away all night and how I wanted 
her to see you and never leave again. I have now had nearly six months of this yet 
I cannot understand why one person would want to hurt another person this way. I 
am too naive or dumb to get it, (one of mommy's friends even said, get a life to 
me. Just how do I do that?) 
* * * 
I am going to Vernal today [with Tony Whitaker] to look at some property. Tony 
and Chris are going to have a baby girl any day now. Did I tell you that Rich and 
Jen have a baby girl and Glen and Teresa will have a baby at about September 11th? 
* * * 
I am back to my ideal weight so don't worry that I don't eat much. I go to 
the spa a lot and [got] some sun. My hair bleached out like it use to when I was 
younger. 
* * * 
I cannot help being [in love] and I know that someday you will understand 
me if you take time to be with me. 
* * * 
Please forgive me someday and phone or send pictures of you and 
especially mommy if you can. 
(Case No. 873 at 178:114-117; Exhibit PI 1; the letter is contained in Addendum F, here-
to.) The letter also stated, "I keep hoping to hear some sign that you think of me. Father's 
day passed, my anniversary with mommy will soon pass. Life goes on without me." 
I do pray for you and I know you can feel [] my love, is this enough? You might 
say someday that this is all my fault, but I don't see what I could have done. I can 
change and do things differently in the future and forget the past. But how do I for-
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get my own flesh and blood and my wife that I thought wanted me like I need her? 
(Case No. 873, Exhibit PI 1.) Courtney also testified that the envelope addressed to the 
children may have contained a card for her father with a note that stated, "please 
forward.M (Case No. 873 at 178:117-18; Exhibit P12.) 
According to Courtney, her children would not have been able to forward the card, 
they would not have understood portions of the letter addressed to them, they did not 
know some of the people/places identified in the letter, and they would not have 
understood dates or the meaning of September 11. (Case No. 873 at 178:115-118.) 
Additional evidence relating to the matter included the following: Hardy's oldest 
child, Breque, was eight years old when Hardy sent the letters. (Case No. 873 at 178:84.) 
She had limited reading abilities and suffered from a form of autism. (See id. at 178:84-
85.) The second child, Miquelle, was six years old and in kindergarten. (Id. at 178:85.) 
She was starting to recognize letters and had limited reading abilities. (Id. at 178:85-86.) 
Hardy's two youngest children could not read at all. (Id at 178:86.) 
At the time of trial, Hardy's children were able to read. (Case No. 873 at 178:85 
(the children are now able to read).) In addition, Courtney testified that the children 
eventually would be able to understand the letters (id at 178:129) and possibly would like 
a recipe for stuffed trout (id. at 178:129). Indeed, someday the children may wish to 
understand the breakup from the perspective of both parents and the letters would 
facilitate that. Also, Courtney was unable to dispute that Hardy typically talked to the 
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children about his feelings, as he did in the letters. (Id. at 178:129.) 
While the state's evidence supported that letters contained content too mature for 
the children at their ages, that is not sufficient to support that "the real intended recipient 
of [the] communication[s] was Courtney Hardy." (Id. at 178:56 (prosecutor identified his 
theory to the jury).) That is, there was an evidentiary void in the state's case. 
The state failed to present evidence to support that the letters were somehow for 
Courtney. Specifically, there is no indication on the face of the letters that they were a 
form of communication or contact intended for Courtney, directly or indirectly, where the 
letters were addressed to the children. (See Exhibit P10 and PI 1.) In addition, the state 
failed to show that any part of either letter constituted a contact/communication with 
Courtney. That is, the state failed to show that Hardy expected the children to 
communicate any part of the letters to Courtney; it failed to show that Hardy otherwise 
used the children to communicate indirectly with Courtney; and it failed to show that the 
letters were in any way for Courtney's benefit. (Case No. 873 at 178.) 
Further, there is no indication that Courtney believed6 the letters were intended for 
her, either directly or indirectly (see Case No. 873 at 178:111-18, 123-24, (Courtney's 
testimony regarding the June 7 and 24 letters)). Also, while Courtney may have 
6 Such a belief would be irrelevant in any respect since, under Utah law, Courtney's 
beliefs could not be imputed to Hardy. State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983) 
(recognizing that the mental state of another may not be imputed to defendant; his 
criminal responsibility will be determined only by his mental state). 
25 
disagreed with the content of the letters to the children, that is not sufficient to support 
that Hardy directly or indirectly contacted or otherwise communicated with Courtney. 
Finally, based on the evidence presented at trial in this case, it would be inappro-
priate for the jury to infer that the letters were for Courtney. Specifically, evidence was 
presented to support that the letters were for the children at a later date, when they could 
understand the content. (See Case No. 873 at 178:129 (Courtney testified the children 
eventually probably would be able to understand the letters).) While the jury was at 
liberty to disregard Courtney's testimony to that effect, such disregard simply would 
create a void in the matter. The record still lacked evidence to support that the letters 
were for Courtney. See Krauss v. Utah State Dept. of Trans., 852 P.2d 1014, 1022 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (while the jury is free to believe or disbelieve evidence presented at trial, 
it may not make inferences where there is an evidentiary void), overruled on other 
grounds. Child v. Newsome, 892 P.2d 9, 11 n.4 (Utah 1995); State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 
782, 791 (Utah App. 1998) (expressing that Court "must take special care to ensure that 
our review of the evidence does not encourage the indulging of'inference upon inference,' 
or, worse, the indulging of inference upon assumption" where relevant evidence is 
lacking), affd. State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911; see also infra Point I.B.(2). 
In sum, evidence that the letters contained content too mature for the children at 
their ages was not sufficient to support that Hardy engaged in direct or indirect contact or 
communications with Courtney. Under § 30-6-4.2, the protective order and other rele-
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vant statutory provisions, Hardy was not prohibited from sending letters to the children. 
Further, he was not prohibited from discussing his feelings with his children even though 
they may not fully appreciate or understand his letters at their young ages. 
While Courtney disagreed with the content of the letters, that is not sufficient to 
support a crime. The convictions cannot be sustained on the record in this case. 
(2) Case No. 991200131 and Entry of the Guilty Plea for a Misdemeanor Offense. 
For the same reason this Court cannot sustain the convictions in Case No. 873, it 
cannot sustain the conviction for the misdemeanor offense in Case No. 131. See 
supra Point I.B.(l). In that case, the trial judge made the following findings in connection 
with the entry of the guilty plea on the misdemeanor offense. 
. . . Mr. Hardy, I think, any reasonable soul reading these letters and knowing the 
little we do about your children as described by your wife in response to these 
questions, would have to conclude that these letters were intended for an audience 
wider than that to which they were addressed. 
And that's an obtuse way of saying, it's clear to me you were writing to your wife, 
your ex-wife, Courtney Hardy. 
(Case No. 131 at 93:28-29.) The trial court's ruling is attached hereto as Addendum G. 
The marshaled evidence relating to the findings was substantially similar to the evidence 
set forth above. See supra. Point I.B.(l). It included the following: Courtney obtained a 
protective order prohibiting Hardy from contacting or communicating with her, either 
directly or indirectly. (Case No. 131 at 93:8-9.) On June 7 and 24, 1999, letters arrived 
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from Hardy addressed to the children, ages 8, 6, 3, and 1. (Id. at 93:10-11.) At the time, 
the oldest child had a "mild form of autism" and the younger children were unable to 
read. (Id. at 93:11.) The letters "talk[ed] about [Courtney] quite a bit" and contained 
information, as set forth above. (Id. at 93:12.) 
Additional evidence presented in connection with Case No. 131 included the 
following: Courtney testified that while she assumed the June 7 letter was for the 
children, "actually [it was] pointed to me. I mean there are — there's a recipe, et cetera, 
for my children which don't cook." (Case No. 131 at 93:12.) Courtney also testified that 
the June 24 letter "says dear children, but again it was a letter that they would not be able 
to comprehend nor read. It was a letter that I am guessing was directed at me." (Id. at 
93:14.) "If it was directed at the children, which I don't believe, it was, it was very 
inappropriate, and not something they could understand." (Id. at 93:15; see also id. at 
93:14.) Also, the letters were not "appropriate for my children. They [were] way beyond 
their age level of comprehension." (IdL at 93:12.) 
Courtney further testified that at the time the letters were sent, the children would 
not have been able to understand certain references to people and places in the letters, 
including the reference to a cruise, Vernal, and Hardy's "ideal weight"; and they would 
not be able to forward the card to her father. (Id. at 93:13-17.) 
Lastly, Courtney admitted that the letters were not addressed to her (id. at 93:20). 
The evidence in the misdemeanor case differed from the evidence in Case No. 873 
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in that Courtney testified she believed the letters were for her. Courtney's beliefs do not 
alter the conclusion that the evidence was insufficient, for three reasons. 
First, under the law, Courtney's beliefs about the matter are not sufficient to 
convict Hardy. Crick, 675 P.2d at 534 (mental state of another may not be imputed to 
defendant; his criminal responsibility will be determined only by his mental state). 
Second, under the law, a letter that is properly directed and placed in a post office 
creates a presumption that it reached its destination and was actually received "by the 
person to whom it was addressed." Hagner v. U.S., 285 U.S. 427, 430 (1932) (the 
presumption is a well-settled rule). The letters in this case were addressed and directed to 
the "Courtney and Dale Hardy children." (Case No. 131 at 93:19-20) Courtney admitted 
the letters were not addressed to her; she believed they were for her because she 
intercepted their delivery. (Id.) That does not support a finding that the letters were for 
Courtney. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (Court refused to find that 
vulgar language, that was not directed to any particular persons, was actionable since 
persons could protect "their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes"). 
Third, the state failed to offer any basis in the evidence to support that the letters 
were for Courtney. That is, while Courtney claimed the children were too young to 
understand the letters, that is not sufficient. The state did not provide evidence that the 
letters were for Courtney's benefit. By way of example, Courtney testified that the June 7 
letter included a recipe for stuffed trout. She believed the recipe was not for her children 
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because they did not cook. (Case No. 131 at 93:12.) However, there is no evidence that 
Courtney cooked and no evidence to otherwise support that the recipe was for her. (See 
Case No. 131 at 93, generally.) 
Also, there was a reference in the June 7 letter to a cruise. The letter stated, "I still 
believe that your mommy would trust me and like me if she would converse with me -
that is why I wanted her to go with me on the cruise." (See Case No. 873, Exhibit P10.) 
Courtney explained that reference as follows: approximately six weeks after she obtained 
the January protective order, Hardy "got11 a cruise and tried "to convince [her] to go" on 
it. (Case No. 131 at 93:13.) Significantly, there is no indication that Courtney believed 
Hardy was still trying to "convince" her of that in the June 7 letter. (See generally, kL at 
93.) Thus, there is no basis to find that the statement was a communication to Courtney. 
In sum, while the judge determined the letters were not appropriate for the children 
at their ages, there is no support for the finding that the letters were for Courtney. As set 
forth above, supra Point I.B.(l), the state failed to prove that Hardy expected the children 
to communicate any part of the letter to Courtney; that Hardy somehow used the children 
to communicate indirectly with Courtney; or that the letters were for Courtney's benefit. 
(Case No. 131 at 93, generally.) For the reasons set forth herein, the conviction should be 
reversed. 
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POINT II. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS THAT GOVERN IN THIS 
MATTER ARE OVERLY BROAD, WHERE THEY INFRINGE ON FREE 
SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT. AND THEY ARE VAGUE 
AND AMBIGUOUS. 
At the conclusion of the state's case in chief, the defense asked the trial court to 
declare the relevant statutory provisions and protective order unconstitutional. Defense 
counsel argued that if paragraph 3 of the protective order could be construed to preclude 
Hardy from writing letters to his children, the provision violated Hardy's right to 
associate with his children. (Case No. 873 at 178:136.) Defense counsel also argued that 
the provisions interfered with Hardy's right to free speech and communication, where the 
communications here were not violent, threatening, abusive or "fighting words." (Case 
No. 873 at 178:139-40.) Finally, defense counsel argued that the provisions went too far, 
in that they penalized innocent conduct. (Case No. 873 at 178:140.) The trial judge 
rejected the arguments and denied defense counsel's motions. (Id. at 178:140-42.) 
Counsel's arguments relating to the relevant statutory provisions and protective 
order compel application of the vagueness doctrine. See Reno v. ACLII 521 U.S. 844, 
871-72 (1997) (vagueness raises special First Amendment concerns because of the 
obvious chilling effect on free speech); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-
09 (1972) (in analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, the Court considers whether 
vagueness interferes with First Amendment freedoms); see also Edwards v. Louisiana, 
372 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1963) (a statute that affects first amendment rights must be 
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precisely drawn); State v. Pierson, 476 N.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Neb. 1991) (counsel's 
argument that statute was overly broad embraced vagueness doctrine); Stock v. State, 526 
P.2d 3, 7-8 (Alaska 1974) ("overbreadth11 is an aspect of the vagueness analysis). 
The United States Supreme Court has articulated a three-part analysis to determine 
whether a statute is vague or overly broad: 
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is 
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by 
not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is 
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. 
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, 
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant 
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a 
vague statute Mabut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it 
"operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings 
inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' 
. . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." 
Gravned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (notes omitted): see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
357 (1983); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
498-99 (1982); Greenwood v. City of No. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991); Salt 
Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1265 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine requires the legislature to define an offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement). 
As set forth below, the statutory provisions and protective order at issue in this 
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case (1) fail to give fair notice to Hardy and those persons who may be subjected to the 
provisions, (2) fail to adequately guard against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, 
and (3) fail to provide sufficient breathing space for First Amendment rights. See 
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09. They must be stricken as unconstitutional. 
A. SECTION 30-6-4,2(2)fb) FAILS TO ADEQUATELY DEFINE A CRIME, 
THEREBY REQUIRING A PERSON TO GUESS AT WHAT CONDUCT IS 
PROHIBITED. 
The first consideration under Grayned is whether the statutory provisions at issue 
give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited 
so that he may govern himself accordingly. See State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 
1986) (finding due process violation where statute failed to adequately define prohibited 
conduct). The United States Supreme Court and Utah Supreme Court have stressed that 
the reasonable man is entitled to be informed as to what the law requires or prohibits. 
"No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning 
of penal statues. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or 
forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). 
Also, "'[the] determinative factor is whether there is a reasonable degree of 
common understanding of what is encompassed within the general terms of prohibition.'" 
State v. Owens. 638 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Utah 1981) (citing State v. Samter. 479 P.2d237, 
239 (Or. App. 1971)). "[A] criminal violation should be described with sufficient 
certainty so that persons of ordinary intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may know how 
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to govern themselves in conformity with it." Id. 
In this case, §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and 76-5-108, and the protective order prohibit 
Hardy from intentionally/knowingly contacting or otherwise communicating with 
Courtney, directly or indirectly. As set forth above (see supra. Point I.A.(2)), the terms 
"directly," "indirectly," "otherwise communicating," and "contacting" as used in § 30-6-
4.2(2)(b) are not defined in the relevant statutes. 
While the dictionary defines the terms ("direct" or "indirect" "communication" or 
"contact" involves an immediate, firsthand, personal, or a secondhand, roundabout, 
incidental exchange, meeting, or association of words, signals or gestures), that is not 
enough. The terms are general and expansive; they embrace and penalize innocent 
conduct. "[The] broadness of the phrase [is] nowhere limited and nothing [can] be found 
to indicate that the legislature intended any limitation." Owens, 638 P.2d at 1183 (cite 
omitted). The statute is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. 
By way of example, as stated above (supra Point I. A., herein), the protective order 
provided Courtney with custody of the children and it provided Hardy with visitation 
rights. (See Exhibit P2.) According to Courtney, she and Hardy also were required to 
cooperate and work together to preserve the marital assets, including the house, trust 
assets, and other properties. (Case No. 873 at 178:127.) 
In the context of this case, some contact or communication was inevitable and 
necessary between the parties, either direct or indirect, at least as it related to the children 
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and visitation. Yet, on the face of § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and the protective order, Hardy was 
prohibited from engaging in such contact or communication. That is unreasonable. 
Indeed, in that regard, the statutory provisions and protective order convey confusing and 
contradicting messages. 
In addition, on the face of the provisions, Hardy was prohibited from using a third 
party (i.e. an attorney) to communicate with Courtney about matters relating to the 
children or visitation since such conduct would constitute "indirect" contact. That is 
unreasonable. The legislature's failure to place limits on the reach of the statute renders it 
unconstitutional. It sweeps within its ambit innocent conduct. 
The statute and protective order also are vague as applied to Hardy in this matter. 
While he was prohibited from directly/indirectly contacting/communicating with 
Courtney, he was not advised that communicating about Courtney would constitute an 
offense. To the extent the statute may be construed to reach the conduct in this case, it 
did not put Hardy on notice of that fact. See Blowers. 717 P.2d at 1322-23 (conviction 
for driving under the influence violated defendant's due process rights since he was not 
on notice that statute could apply to him for riding a horse while intoxicated); see 
also Maheu v. Hughes Tool Company, 503 P.2d 4, 7-8 (Nev. 1972) (preliminary 
injunction entered by the lower court ordered appellant to return all books, records, 
communications and documents that pertained "directly or indirectly" to the operation of 
appellee's business; on appeal the court ruled that the injunctive order lacked definiteness 
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and was vague and ambiguous "because it place[d] the recipient of the order, Maheu, in 
constant jeopardy if he guesse[d] wrong" as to what was required under the order). 
This case presents a situation where Utah law fails to adequately define essential 
statutory terms, i.e. "direct," "indirect," "contacting" and "otherwise communicating." 
Indeed, the terms seem to encompass any and all forms of expression from Hardy that 
relate to his wife. The provisions are susceptible of multiple meanings and seek to 
penalize innocent conduct. See State v. Bradshaw. 541 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Utah 1975) 
(phrase "intentionally interfered with a law officer" was unconstitutionally vague where 
term "interfered" was capable of more than one meaning). In addition, the provisions 
prevent a reasonable man from ascertaining whether his conduct conforms to the statute. 
That is inappropriate. Section 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and the protective order must be stricken 
under the first prong of the Grayned analysis. 
B. THE PROVISIONS ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO ARBITRARY AND 
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT. THAT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In this matter, Hardy argued that the protective order was unconstitutional in that it 
criminalized innocent conduct in its broad sweep. (See Case No. 873 at 178:140.) The 
trial judge rejected Hardy's argument and ruled that the jury would be allowed to decide 
whether the conduct in this case constituted a violation of the protective order. According 
to the trial judge, the jury would decide whether letters to the children about Courtney and 
about Hardy's feelings of sorrow and apology should be penalized under Utah's criminal 
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statute. (Id. at 178:140-41.) The trial judge applied an incorrect standard to the matter. 
Specifically, the second consideration under Grayned is whether the law provides 
sufficiently explicit standards for those who apply it in order that it will not be enforced in 
an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to police, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary/discriminatory application. Grayned, 408 
U.S. at 108-09. Since Section 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and the protective order fail to specify in 
adequate terms when a person has crossed the line, it impermissibly allows judges, 
prosecutors and juries to define the limits of the law. 
Stated another way, the legislature is required to establish minimal guidelines to 
govern law enforcement. Otherwise, it has provided a f!standardless sweep [that] allows 
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections." Kolender, 461 
U.S. at 357-58; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109. Justice Howe identified the hazards of such 
vague statutes under the second prong of the Grayned analysis, as follows: 
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to 
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who 
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some 
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government. 
Blowers, 717 P.2d at 1324 (Howe, J., concurring) (citing, U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 
221, 23 L.Ed. 563(1875)). 
Because § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) defines unlawful conduct in broad terms, it serves as a 
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large net, encompassing innocent as well as criminal conduct, and it invites judges and 
juries to decide how the law will be applied. 
In Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), the United States Supreme Court 
considered a Georgia statute that made it a crime for a person to use "opprobrious words 
or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace." Id. at 519. The Court noted 
that while the Georgia appellate courts attempted to construe the statute so as to limit its 
application to "fighting words", those courts actually affirmed jury convictions that 
should not have been prosecuted in the first place because the utterances at issue failed to 
rise to a criminal level. Id. at 525. The Supreme Court considered this unacceptable. 
"We conclude that '[t]he separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more 
sensitive tools than [Georgia] has supplied.'" Id at 528 (citing Speiser v. Randall 357 
U.S. 513, 525 (1958)). The Supreme Court ruled that Georgia's approach to the matter 
gave Georgia juries license to create their "own standard in each case." Id. (citing Hern-
don v. Lowrv, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937)). The legislature's failure to define the prohibited 
conduct left the standard of responsibility wide open and susceptible to improper 
application by courts and juries. 
The Utah statute is also susceptible to improper and arbitrary enforcement by 
courts and juries where it fails to define important terms. The statute defines an offense 
in such broad terms that it allows the courts (and in this case, the jury) to engage in the 
legislative function of deciding what is prohibited and who will be subjected to 
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prosecution under the all-encompassing provisions. Given the fact that § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) 
may be applied/abused in selective and arbitrary ways, it is unconstitutional. 
C. THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN S 30-6-4.2(2¥b) INTER-
FERE WITH A PERSON'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
The third consideration under the Grayned analysis is whether the statute inhibits 
the exercise of "basic First Amendment freedoms." Grayned. 408 U.S. at 108-09; see 
also Whatcott 2000 UT App. 86. Speech and association are protected freedoms under 
the First Amendment. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18-19 (freedom of expression is guaranteed by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 
(1958) ("It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of 
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech"). 
In the event § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and the protective order may be interpreted to apply 
to the matters in this case, the relevant provisions are overly broad and interfere with 
Hardy's ability to communicate and associate with his children/and or his estranged wife 
about innocent and necessary matters.7 
7 Portions of § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) (providing that respondent may not telephone, harass, 
contact or otherwise communicate with petitioner) may already be unconstitutional under 
current case law. In Whatcott, 2000 UT App 86, ffl[14-16, this Court ruled that the tele-
phone harassment statute in part is facially overbroad. The telephone harassment statute 
is made applicable to the Cohabitant Abuse Act, via §§ 30-6-1(6) and 77-36-l(2)(e). 
Those provisions define "domestic violence" as including telephone harassment. 
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(1) The Purpose of the Cohabitant Abuse Act. 
To begin, under a First Amendment analysis, this Court will consider whether the 
legislature has enacted a statute that serves a legitimate purpose without imposing 
unnecessary restrictions on speech and conduct protected under the First Amendment. 
Reno, 521 U.S. at 875-76. "The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech forbid the 
States to punish the use of words or language not within 'narrowly limited classes of 
speech.'" Gooding, 405 U.S. at 521-22 (citing Chaplinskv v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568,571(1942)). 
Even as to such a class, however, because "the line between speech unconditional-
ly guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or 
punished is finely drawn," Speiser v. Randall, [357 U.S. 513, 525] (1958), "(i)n 
every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permis-
sible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom," Cantwell v. Connecticut, [310 
U.S. 296, 304] (1940). In other words, the statute must be carefully drawn or be 
authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible 
of application to protected expression. "Because First Amendment freedoms need 
breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow 
specificity." NAACP ' Button, supra, [371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)]. 
Gooding, 405 U.S. at 522. Also, this Court has stated the following: 
A statute will be invalidated for overbreadth only if it "'does not aim specifically 
at evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps 
within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an 
exercise of freedom of speech of the press.'" [Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 
1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (cite omitted)]. "[Particularly where conduct and not 
merely speech is involved . . . the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, 
but substantial as well. . . . " Broadrick v. Oklahoma, [413 U.S. 601, 615] (1973); 
see State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837, 841 (Utah 1978). Further, a "'statute should not 
be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing 
construction.'" Haig, 578 P.2d at 841 (Maughan, J., concurring in result) (quoting 
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Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, [422 U.S. 205, 216] (1975)). As an overarching 
principle, we will construe a statute as constitutional whenever possible. See State 
v. MohL 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 1995). 
Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, f 8; Morrison. 2001 UT 73, [^6. 
The statute at issue in this case prohibits a defendant (identified in the protective 
order as the "respondent") from communicating in all respects directly or indirectly with a 
"petitioner," who has obtained a protective order in a civil case on proof of domestic 
violence or abuse. Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(2)(b). The provision apparently is aimed 
at preventing abuse and violence. 
Indeed, this Court has recognized that the Cohabitant Abuse Act serves to protect 
those who are in fear of physical harm resulting from past conduct coupled with a present 
threat of future harm. Strollo, 828 P.2d at 535; see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-106 
(1999) (defining "harassment" as threat to commit a violent felony); 30-6-1 (defining 
"abuse" and "domestic violence"); 77-36-1 (defining "abuse" and "domestic violence"). 
Hardy does not dispute that for purposes of this matter, the Cohabitant Abuse Act 
may serve a legitimate purpose. Thus, the provision here (§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b)) may be 
upheld if it aims only at evils "within the allowable area of state control." Whatcott, 2000 
UT App 86, f 8. On that point, the statute fails. 
It "sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute 
an exercise of freedom of speech or the press." Id. It criminalizes conduct that is 
protected under the First Amendment and it criminalizes conduct that does not serve the 
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purpose of the statute, as further discussed below. 
(2) The State Legislature May Punish Threats of Harm. Domestic Abuse. Violence. 
Intimidation, and Conduct that Incites Violence. 
Areas of state control include the following: the state may regulate conduct/speech 
/expression that is harassing, violent, abusive, threatening, libelous, or obscene, or that 
constitutes extortion, perjury, conspiracy, or fraud. See Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, TflO; 
State v. Brown. 748 P.2d 276, 279 (Wash. App. 1988) (threats of harm do not fall within 
the realm of protected speech); State v. Chung. 862 P.2d 1063, 1072 (Haw. 1993) (same); 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (freedoms 
of speech, of assembly and of worship are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave 
and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect); Roth v. U.S., 
354 U.S. 476 (1957) (government has the power to deal with obscene/erotic expression). 
The legislature also may "punish 'fighting' words under carefully drawn statutes 
not also susceptible of application to protected expression.1' Gooding, 405 U.S. at 523 
(cites omitted). "Fighting words" have been defined as those words that have "a direct 
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is 
addressed." Chaplinskv, 315 U.S. at 573. 
[Fighting words] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them 
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. "Resort to 
epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information 
or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act 
would raise no question under that instrument." 
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14 at 572 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296, 309, 310 (1940)). 
In Cohen v. California. 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of "fighting words." There, defendant was charged with "maliciously 
and willfully disturbing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person *** by *** 
offensive conduct." Id, at 16. Specifically, he was seen in the Los Angeles County 
Courthouse wearing a jacket that stated, "F the Draft." Id. For that offense, 
defendant was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment. Id. 
On review, the United State Supreme Court assessed whether the message on the 
jacket constituted fighting words. To that end, the Court considered the following: First, 
whether the jacket was directed at a particular person or group of persons, which it was 
not, id. at 20; and second, whether the words on the jacket were "personally abusive 
epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common 
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction." Id, at 20 (citing Chaplinskv, 
315 U.S. at 573). Under that analysis, the Court ruled the message constituted free 
speech; it could not be penalized under the "fighting words" analysis. 
In considering the analysis in Cohen, the second factor warrants further discussion. 
Specifically, the "ordinary citizen" standard is an "objective" standard. See T.W. v. 
State, 665 So.2d 987, 988-89 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) ("Clearly, this test 'is an objective 
one.'") (citing State v. Authelet 385 A.2. 642, 649 (R.I. 1978)). 
It "protects [the defendant] against supersensitive addressees. The addressee's 
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personal disagreement with or anger over words said to him does not, by itself, mean that 
the words can be punished as fighting words." City of Seattle v. Cambv. 701 P.2d 499, 
501 (Wash. 1985) (en banc); see also Gooding, 405 U.S. at 528 (a standard that allows 
juries to determine "fighting words" gives too much license and is too broad). Also, it is 
not enough "if words merely offend, cause one to be indignant, or rouse anger in the per-
son hearing the words; they must incite an addressee to breach the peace immediately." 
Svedbergv. Stamness. 525 N.W.2d 678, 683 (N.D. 1994). "Hence, a state may not 
punish merely offensive or abusive speech without a showing that the average person 
under the circumstances, if the target of such words, would be prone to an immediate 
violent response." People v. Prisinzano, 648 N.Y.S.2d 267, 273 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1996). 
A third prong in the analysis considers the "words" in the particular context of the 
case. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 778 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
("[W]hether a specific act of communication is protected by the First Amendment always 
requires some consideration of both its content and its context"); Lewis v. New Orleans, 
415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[W]ords may or may not be Tighting 
words/ depending upon the circumstances of their utterance"). 
Applying the three-part analysis articulated above, the statutory provision and 
protective order here go too far. Thus, they are unconstitutional, as set forth below. 
(3) Section 30-6-4.2(2) (b) and the Protective Order Penalize Innocent Conduct. 
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The Utah provision at issue here "sweeps within its ambit" conduct that is 
protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, ^8. 
The statute is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to the facts of this case. 
(a) The Statutory Provisions and Protective Order Criminalize Conduct that Does 
Not Relate to the Purposes Served by the Cohabitant Abuse Act. 
Assuming arguendo the Cohabitant Abuse Act serves to protect petitioners — who 
are reasonably in fear of physical harm — from domestic abuse, intimidation, violence, 
threats, and harassment, Hardy maintains that relevant portions of § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and 
the protective order are not carefully drawn so as to serve that purpose. Rather, the provi-
sions are so broadly worded that they sweep within their ambit protected communication. 
On the face of § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) there is no attempt to distinguish between criminal 
communication or contact, and innocent communication or contact. That is, whether the 
communications are intimidating, threatening, abusive, violent or harassing; whether they 
engender fear; whether they constitute "fighting words"; or whether they relate to health 
insurance or visitation issues concerning the children, they are all treated alike, subject to 
criminal prosecution and penalty under § 30-6-4.2(2)(b). Further there is no attempt to 
distinguish between communications in public places (i.e. in a court conference room 
with an attorney) and communications at or in the sanctity of the petitioner's residence. 
Indeed, the phrase that prohibits direct/indirect communication/contact cannot be 
said "sufficiently to inform the ordinary person," Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19, that the statute is 
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meant to distinguish between "allowable area[s] of state control" and "activities that in 
ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech." Whatcott 2000 UT 
App 86, TJ8. On that basis, the language is overly broad. 
By way of specific example, under the plain language of the statute, a respondent 
is in violation of the law if he communicates with or contacts the petitioner to report 
information about the children's health insurance or visitation. He is in violation of the 
law for "indirect" "contact" if he makes arrangements to get mail that was mis-routed to 
the marital address after service of the protective order; and he is in violation of that same 
provision if he asks his attorney or a mutual acquaintance to contact his wife or her 
attorney about such matters. 
While each act described above is innocent and protected behavior, the vague 
language of § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) sweeps such conduct within its prohibitions, and subjects a 
respondent to criminal prosecution and incarceration for the innocent conduct. 
According to the plain language of the statute, a respondent is prohibited from 
engaging in "a potentially huge universe of otherwise legitimate" conduct, Whatcott, 
2000 UT App 86, ^|11, including necessary direct and indirect contact and communication 
with the petitioner. That makes the statute overly broad on its face. See id. at ^ [8. 
(b) The Statute Is Overly Broad as Applied to Hardy. 
Section 30-6-4.2(2)(b) also is overly broad as applied to this matter. The letters in 
this case that resulted in a violation of the plea in abeyance and the two felony 
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convictions do not rise to the level of harassing, violent, obscene, threatening, or abusive 
conduct. Also, the statements in the letters are not "fighting words" even when the words 
are considered in the particular context of this case. 
Specifically, considering the first prong of the Cohen/Chaplinsky analysis, the 
addressees in this case were Hardy's children. Courtney admitted the letters were not 
addressed to her, and that she came into contact with them when she intercepted their 
delivery. See supra. Point LB. That is insufficient to constitute "fighting words" under 
the Cohen/Chaplinsky analysis. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (if persons, who are not 
intended addressees, come into contact with the vulgar and offensive message on the 
jacket, they may protect their "sensibilities simply by averting their eyes"). 
Next, under the second prong of the analysis, the letters did not contain language 
that would likely provoke a violent reaction, or that otherwise could be construed to be 
"fighting words" or criminal words. Rather, the letters contained expressions of sorrow, 
remorse and devotion: "I feel that she [Courtney] did not know me well enough, but I 
always wanted her to." "I still believe that your mom [Courtney] would trust me and like 
me if she would converse with me. That is why I wanted her to go with me on the 
cruise." "I know too, how she feels now by my threats to leave or [to] make her leave 
you children, and I do not deserve to see you again. I am so very sorry and will spend my 
life making it up to her and you some way. Please know that I was not aware of the pain I 
caused your mommy..." (Exhibit P10.) 
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Also, "I only wish that I knew what I had done to have you treat me this way." "I 
remember how hurt I felt when mommy stayed away all night and how I wanted her to 
see you and never leave again. I have now had nearly six months of this yet I cannot 
understand why one person would want to hurt another person this way. I am too naive 
or dumb to 'get it.' One of mommy's friends even said, 'get a life' to me. Just how do I 
do that?" "Please forgive me someday and phone or send pictures of you and especially 
mommy if you can." "I cannot help being in love and I know that someday you will 
understand me if you take time to be with me." (Exhibit PI 1.) 
Finally, even when we consider that Hardy was subject to a protective order 
entered in civil court, and Courtney was an abused, threatened spouse under the 
Cohabitant Abuse Act, the statements in the letters do not warrant prosecution as 
"fighting words." Likewise, they are not threatening, abusive, violent, or harassing as 
defined under the law. Even when the protective order "history" is factored into the 
analysis, the conduct giving rise to a criminal prosecution must be more than words of 
sorrow, devotion and love.8 
Even for this victim, the letters are innocuous. The constitution requires more 
before a person may be prosecuted and punished for his actions. To that end, where the 
8 Significantly, Courtney did not testify that she felt threatened, abused, violated, 
intimidated, worried, anxious, distressed, harassed, or blackmailed by the June letters. 
(See generally, Case No. 873 at 178; Case No. 131 at 93.) She never suggested that the 
letters in any way made her prone to an immediate violent response or breach of the 
peace. She simply disagreed with the content of the letters. 
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legislature failed to carefully define the conduct giving rise to criminal prosecution, and 
failed to distinguish between criminal "contact" or "communication," and innocent 
conduct, the statute is unconstitutional. Section 30-6-4.2(2)(b) sweeps too broadly in its 
prohibitions and must be stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Hardy respectfully requests that this Court 
construe the relevant statutory provisions and the protective order in this matter to require 
proof that the contact/communication was violent, abusive, or threatening to support a 
crime. In the event the provisions may be construed in that fashion, the evidence in this 
case is insufficient to support the convictions. 
In the event the provisions may not be construed as requested, Section 30-6-
4.2(2)(b) and the related protective order are unconstitutional and must be stricken. 
SUBMITTED this ^ d a y of V U < M ^ ^ 2001. 
LINDA M. JONES 
ROBERT HEINEMAN 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on October 10, 2001, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
LINDA M. JONES 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
Dated this October 10, 2001. 
iaH(%^'^y 
Case No. 20010396-CA 
ADDENDUM C 
76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another 
— Violation. 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective 
order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant 
Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, 
Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as 
described in Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly violates that 
order after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, 
except as a greater penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, 
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic violence 
offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in accordance 
with Section 77-36-1.1. 
77-36-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Cohabitant" has the same meaning as in Section 30-6-1. 
(2) "Domestic violence" means any criminal offense involving violence 
or physical harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt, 
conspiracy, or solicitation to commit a criminal offense involving violence 
or physical harm, when committed by one cohabitant against smother. 
"Domestic violence'' also means commission or attempt to commit, any of 
the following offenses by one cohabitant against another: 
(a) aggravated assault, as described in Section 76-5-103; 
(b) assault, as described in Section 76-5-102; 
(c) criminal homicide, as described in Section 76-5-201; 
(d) harassment, as described in Section 76-5-106; 
(e) telephone harassment, as described in Section 76-9-201; 
(f) kidnaping, child kidnaping, or aggravated kidnaping, as de-
scribed in Sections 76-5-301, 76-5-301.1, and 76-5-302; 
(g) mayhem, as described in Section 76-5-105; 
(h) sexual offenses, as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and 
Title 76, Chapter 5a; 
(i) stalking, as described in Section 76-5-106.5; 
(j) unlawful detention, as described in Section 76-5-304; 
(k) violation of a protective order or ex parte protective order, as 
described in Section 76-5-108; 
(1) any offense against property described in Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Part 1, 2, or 3; 
(m) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault, as 
described in Section 76-10-507; 
(n) discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or in the 
direction of any person, building, or vehicle, as described in Section 
76-10-508: or 
(o) disorderly conduct, as defined in Section 76-9-102, if a convic-
tion of disorderly conduct is the result of a plea agreement in which 
the defendant was originally charged with any of the domestic 
violence offenses otherwise described in this Subsection (2). Convic-
tion of disorderly conduct as a domestic violence offense, in the 
manner described in this Subsection (2)(o), does not constitute a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 921, 
and is exempt from the provisions of the federal Firearms Act, 18 
U.S.C. Section 921 et seq. 
(3) "Victim" means a cohabitant who has been subjected to domestic 
violence. 
30-6-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Abuse" means attempting to cause, or intentionally or knowingly 
causing to an adult or minor physical harm or intentionally placing 
another in fear of imminent physical harm. 
(2) "Cohabitant" means an emancipated person pursuant to Section 
15-2-1 or a person who is 16 years of age or older who: 
(a) is or was a spouse of the other party; 
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of the other party; 
(c) is related by blood or marriage to the other party; 
(d) has one or more children in common with the other party; or 
(e) resides or has resided in the same residence as the other party. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), "cohabitant" does not include: 
(a) the relationship of natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-
parent to a minor; or 
(b) the relationship between natural, adoptive, step, or foster 
siblings who are under 18 years of age. 
(4) "Court clerk" means a district court clerk or juvenile court clerk. 
(5) "Department" means the Department of Human Services. 
(6) "Domestic violence" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 77-36-1. 
(7) "Ex parte protective order" means an order issued without notice to 
the defendant in accordance with this chapter. 
(8) "Foreign protective order" means a protective order issued by 
another state, territory, or possession of the United States, tribal lands of 
the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of 
Columbia shall be given full faith and credit in Utah, if the protective 
order is similar to a protective order issued in compliance with Title 30, 
Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant 
Abuse Procedures Act, and includes the following requirements: 
(a) the requirements of due process were met by the issuing court, 
including subject matter and personal jurisdiction; 
(b) the respondent received reasonable notice; and 
(c) the respondent had an opportunity for a hearing regarding the 
protective order. 
(9) "Law enforcement unit" or "law enforcement agency" means any 
public agency having general police power and charged with making 
arrests in connection with enforcement of the criminal statutes and 
ordinances of this state or any political subdivision. 
(10) "Peace officer" means those persons specified in Title 53, Chapter 
13, Peace Officer Classifications. 
(11) "Protective order" means a restraining order issued pursuant to 
this chapter subsequent to a hearing on the petition, of which the 
petitioner has given notice in accordance with this chapter. 
30-6-2. Abuse or danger of abuse — Protective orders. 
(1) Any cohabitant or any child residing with a cohabitant who has been 
subjected to abuse or domestic violence, or to whom there is a substantial 
likelihood of immediate danger of abuse or domestic violence, may seek an ex 
parte protective order or a protective order in accordance with this chapter, 
whether or not that person has left the residence or the premises in an effort 
to avoid further abuse. 
(2) (a) A petition for a protective order may be filed under this chapter 
regardless of whether an action for divorce between the parties is pending. 
(b) If a complaint for divorce has already been filed in district court, a 
petition under this chapter may be filed as part of the divorce proceedings. 
(3) A cohabitant, the department, or any person or institution interested in 
a minor may seek a protective order on behalf of the minor under the 
circumstances described in Subsection (1), regardless of whether the minor 
could have filed a petition on his own behalf. If a cohabitant intends to seek a 
protective order on his own behalf and on behalf of a minor, a single petition 
may be filed. 
(4) The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the minor if the 
court considers the appointment necessary for the welfare of the minor. 
(5) The county attorney or district attorney, if appropriate, shall represent 
the department where the department appears as a petitioner. 
(6) A petition seeking a protective order may not be withdrawn without 
approval of the court. 
30-6-3. Venue of action. 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of any action brought under this 
chapter. The juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction of an action brought 
under this chapter if a protective order is sought on behalf of a minor unless 
the petition is filed by a natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-parent of the 
minor against a natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-parent of the minor. 
(2) An action brought pursuant to this chapter shall be filed in the county 
where either party resides or in which the action complained of took place. 
30-6-4. Forms for petitions and protective orders — Assis-
tance. 
(1) (a) The oflBces of the court clerk shall provide forms and nonlegal 
assistance to persons seeking to proceed under this chapter. 
(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt 
uniform forms for petitions and orders for protection in accordance with 
the provisions of this chapter on or before September 1, 1995. That office 
shall provide the forms to the clerk of each court authorized to issue 
protective orders. The forms shall include: 
(i) a statement notifying the petitioner for an ex parte protective 
order that knowing falsification of any statement or information 
provided for the purpose of obtaining a protective order may subject 
the petitioner to felony prosecution; 
(ii) a separate portion of the form for those provisions, the violation 
of which is a criminal offense, and a separate portion for those 
provisions, the violation of which is a civil violation, as provided in 
Subsection 30-6-4.2(5); 
(iii) language in the criminal provision portion stating violation of 
any criminal provision is a class A misdemeanor, and language in the 
civil portion stating violation of or failure to comply with a civil 
provision is subject to contempt proceedings; 
(iv) a space for information the petitioner is able to provide to 
facilitate identification of the respondent, such as social security 
number, driver license number, date of birth, address, telephone 
number, and physical description; 
(v) a space for the petitioner to request a specific period of time for 
the civil provisions to be in effect, not to exceed 150 days, unless the 
petitioner provides in writing the reason for the requested extension 
of the length of time beyond 150 days; 
(vi) a statement advising the petitioner that when a minor child is 
included in an ex parte protective order or a protective order, as part 
of either the criminal or the civil portion of the order, the petitioner 
may provide a copy of the order to the principal of the school where the 
child attends; and 
(vii) a statement advising the petitioner that if the respondent fails 
to return custody of a minor child to the petitioner as ordered in a 
protective order, the petitioner may obtain from the court a writ of 
assistance. 
(2) If the person seeking to proceed under this chapter is not represented by 
an attorney, it is the responsibility of the court clerk's office to provide: 
(a) the forms adopted pursuant to Subsection (1); 
(b) all other forms required to petition for an order for protection 
including, but not limited to, forms for service; 
(c) clerical assistance in filling out the forms and filing the petition, in 
accordance with Subsection (l)(a). A court clerk's office may designate any 
other entity, agency, or person to provide that service, but the court clerk's 
office is responsible to see that the service is provided; 
(d) information regarding the means available for the service of process; 
(e) a list of legal service organizations that may represent the petitioner 
in an action brought under this chapter, together with the telephone 
numbers of those organizations; and 
(f) written information regarding the procedure for transporting a 
jailed or imprisoned respondent to the protective order hearing, including 
an explanation of the use of transportation order forms when necessary. 
(3) No charges may be imposed by a court clerk, constable, or law enforce-
ment agency for: 
(a) filing a petition under this chapter; 
fb) obtaining an ex parte protective order; 
(c» obtaining copies, either certified or not certified, necessary for 
service or delivery to law enforcement officials; or 
id) fees for service of a petition, ex parte protective order, or protective 
order. 
(4) A petition for an order of protection shall be in writing and verified. 
(5) (a) All orders for protection shall be issued in the form adopted by the 
Administrative Office of the Courts pursuant to Subsection (1). 
(b) Each protective order issued, except orders issued ex parte, shall 
include the following language: 
"Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the 
hearing that gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994, RL. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. 18 U.S.C.A. 2265. this 
order is valid in all the United States, the District of Columbia, tribal 
lands, and United States territories." 
30-6-4.1. Continuing duty to inform court of other pro-
ceedings — Effect of other proceedings. 
(1) At any hearing in a proceeding to obtain an order for protection, each 
party has a continuing duty to inform the court of each proceeding for an order 
for protection, any civil litigation, each proceeding in juvenile court, and each 
criminal case involving either party, including the case name, the file number, 
and the county and state of the proceeding, if that information is known by the 
party 
(2) (a) An order for protection issued pursuant to this chapter is in addition 
to and not in lieu of any other available civil or criminal proceeding. 
(b) A petitioner is not barred from seeking a protective order because of 
other pending proceedings. 
i c * A court may not delay granting relief under this chapter because of 
the existence of a pending civil action between the parties. 
(3) A petitioner may omit his or her address from all documents filed with 
the court under this chapter, but shall separately provide the court with a 
mailing address that is not to be made part of the public record, but that may 
be provided to a peace officer or entity for service of process. 
30-6-4.2. Protective orders — Ex parte protective orders 
— Modification of orders — Service of process — 
Duties of the court. 
(1) If it appears from a petition for an order for protection or a petition to 
modify an order for protection that domestic violence or abuse has occurred or 
a modification of an order for protection is required, a court may: 
t a» without notice, immediately issue an order for protection ex parte or 
modify an order for protection ex parte as it considers necessary to protect 
the petitioner and all parties named to be protected in the petition; or 
(b • upon notice, issue an order for protection or modify an order after a 
hearing, whether or not the respondent appears. 
(2) A court may grant the following relief without notice in an order fo 
protection or a modification issued ex parte: 
(a) enjoin the respondent from threatening to commit or committing 
domestic violence or abuse against the petitioner and any designated 
family or household member; 
(b] prohibit the respondent from harassing, telephoning, contacting, or 
ntV>prwi<5p rnmmnnirat infT wi th thp nptir innpr Hirprt lv or indirpct lv: 
t c) order that the respondent is excluded from the petitioner's residence 
and its premises, and order the respondent to stay away from the 
residence, school, or place of employment of the petitioner, and the 
premises of any of these, or any specified place frequented by the 
petitioner and any designated family or household member; 
{d) upon finding that the respondent's use or possession of a weapon 
may pose a serious threat of harm to the petitioner, prohibit the respon-
dent from purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm or other weapon 
specified by the court; 
ie) order possession and use of an automobile and other essentia 
personal effects, and direct the appropriate law enforcement officer to 
accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the 
petitioner is safely restored to possession of the residence, automobile, and 
other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respon-
dent's removal of personal belongings; 
(f) grant temporary custody of any minor children to the petitioner; 
(g i order any further relief that the court considers necessary to provide 
for the safety and welfare of the petitioner and any designated family or 
household member; and 
(h) if the petition requests child support or spousal support, at the 
hearing on the petition order both parties to provide verification of current 
income, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements of 
year-to-date or other period of earnings, as specified by the court, and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year. 
(3) A court may grant the following relief in an order for prote Tion or a 
modification of an order after notice and hearing, whether or not t. t respon-
dent appears: 
iaj grant the relief described in Subsection (2): and 
(b) specify arrangements for visitation of any minor child by the 
respondent and require supervision of that visitation by a third party or 
deny visitation if necessary to protect the safety of the petitioner or child. 
(4) Following the protective order hearing, the court shall: 
(a) as soon as possible, deliver the order to the county sheriff for service 
of process: 
(b> make reasonable efforts to ensure that the order for protection is 
understood by the petitioner, and the respondent, if present; 
(c) transmit, by the end of the next business day after the order is 
issued, a copy of the order for protection to the local law enforcement 
agency or agencies designated by the petitioner: and 
(d) transmit a copy of the order to the statewide domestic violence 
network described in Section 30-6-8. 
(5) (a; Each protective order shall include two separate portions, one for 
provisions, the violation of which are criminal offenses, and one for 
provisions, the violation of which are civil violations, as follows: 
li) criminal offenses are those under Subsections 30-6-4.2(2)(a) 
through (e), and under Subsection 30-6-4.2(3)(a) as it refers to 
Subsections 30-6-4.2(2)(a) through (e): and 
(ii i civil offenses are those under Subsections 30-6-4.2(2)(f) through 
(h), and Subsection 30-6-4.2(3)1 a i as it refers to Subsections 30-6-
4.2(2)(f' through (h). 
(b) The criminal provision portion shall include a statement that 
violation of any criminal provision is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) The civil provision portion shall include a notice that violation of or 
failure to comply with a civil provision is subject to contempt proceedings. 
(6) The protective order shall include: 
(a) a designation of a specific date, determined by the court, when the 
civil portion of the protective order either expires or is scheduled for 
review by the court, which date may not exceed 150 days after the date the 
order is issued, unless the court indicates on the record the reason for 
setting a date beyond 150 days; 
(b) information the petitioner is able to provide to facilitate identifica-
tion of the respondent, such as social security number, driver license 
number, date of birth, address, telephone number, and physical descrip-
tion; and 
(c) a statement advising the petitioner that: 
(i) after three years from the date of issuance of the protective 
order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the criminal portion of the 
protective order: 
(ii) the petitioner should, within the 30 days prior to the end of the 
three-year period, advise the court of the petitioner's current address 
for notice of any hearing; and 
(iii) the address provided by the petitioner will not be made 
available to the respondent. 
(7) Child support and spouse support orders issued as part of a protective 
order are subject to mandatory income withholding under Title 62A. Chapter 
11, Part 4. Income Withholding, and Title 62A, Chapter 11. Part 5. Universal 
Income Withholding — Non IV-D Obligees, except when the protective order is 
issued ex parte. 
(8) (a) The county sheriff that receives the order from the court, pursuant to 
Subsection i5)(a/. shall provide expedited service for orders for protection 
issued in accordance writh this chapter, and shall transmit verification of 
service of process, when the order has been served, to the statewide 
domestic violence network described in Section 30-6-8. 
(b> This section does not prohibit any law enforcement agency from 
providing service of process if that law enforcement agency: 
(i) has contact with the respondent and service by that law enforce-
ment agency is possible: or 
(ii) determines that under the circumstances, providing service of 
process on the respondent is in the best interests of the petitioner. 
(9) (a) When an order is served on a respondent in a jail or other holding 
facility, the law enforcement agency managing the facility shall make a 
reasonable effort to provide notice to the petitioner at the time the 
respondent is released from incarceration. 
(b) Notification of the petitioner shall consist of a good faith reasonable 
effort to provide notification, including mailing a copy of the notification to 
the last-known address of the victim. 
(10) (a) A court may modify or vacate an order of protection or any 
provisions in the order after notice and hearing, except as limited under 
Subsection (b). 
(b) Criminal provisions of a protective order may not be vacated within 
three years of issuance unless the petitioner: 
(i) is personally served with notice of the hearing as provided in 
Rules 4 and 5. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the petitioner 
personally appears before the court and gives specific consent to the 
vacation of the criminal provisions of the protective order; or 
(ii i submits a verified affidavit, stating agreement to the vacation of 
the criminal provisions of the protective order. 
(11 J A protective order may be modified without a showing of substantial 
and material change in circumstances. 
(12) Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are more specific than the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding protective orders, the provisions of this 
chapter govern. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom,] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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JOANNA B. SAGERS, #5632 
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m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COURTNEY HARDY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DALE DEMONT HARDY, 
Respondent. 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Judge J U U S C f— | 
This matter came for hearing on „\OtfV ^ ^ n *T, before the undersigned. The 
following parties were in attendance: 
Petitioner's attorney Joanna B. Sagers 
Respondent • Respondent's attorney 
*fe^^ Petitioner 
The Court having reviewed Petitioner's Verified Petition for Protective Order and: 
*)£ having received argument and evidence, 
having accepted the stipulation of the parties 
having entered the default of the Respondent for failure to appear 
and it appearing that domestic violence or abuse has occurred, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
(The Judge or Commissioner shall initial 
each section that is included in this Order.) 
1. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to 
commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner. 
MNTIFFS EXHIBIT 
# 
2. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to 
commit abuse or domestic violence against the following minor children and members of 
Petitioner's family or household: 
' The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, 
lephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner. 
4. The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay away, from 
Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at 7772 South Brighton Wayf Salt Lake 
CityrT7teih 8412^ and Respondent is prohibited from terminating or interfering with the 
utility services to the residence. 
5. The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school, place of employment, 
and/or other places, and their premises, frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and 
the designated household and family members. These places are identified by the 
following addresses: 
6. The Court having found that Respondent's use or possession of a weapon may posfe 
a serious threat of harm to Petitioner, the Respondent is prohibited from purchasing, using, 
"or possessing a firearm and/or the following weapon(s): 
7MI X 7. The Petitioner is awarded possession of the following residence, automobile and/or 
other essential personal effects: 7772 South Brighton Way, Salt T^ke rityr TTtah 
84121; green 1993 Cheyy Suburban 4x4; and, all personal property belonging to 
Petitioner and/or the parties* minor child/ren. 
This award is subject to orders concerning the listed property in future domestic 
proceedings, 
8. An officer from the following law enforcement agency: Salt T i^ke County shall 
accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner safely regains possession of the awarded 
property. 
9. An officer from the same law enforcement agency shall facilitate Respondent's 
removal of Respondent's essential personal belongings from the parties1 residence. The 
law enforcement officer shall contact Petitioner to make these arrangements. Respondent 
may not contact the Petitioner or enter the residence to obtain any items. 
10. The Respondent is placed under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
for the purposes of electronic monitoring. Within 24 hours of the execution of this Order, 
the Department of Corrections shall place an electronic monitoring device on Respondent 
and shall install monitoring equipment on the premises of Petitioner and in the residence 
of Respondent. Respondent is ordered to pay to the Department of Corrections the costs 
of the electronic monitoring required by this Order. The Department of Corrections shall 
have access to Petitioner's residence to install the appropriate monitoring equipment. 
RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS "1" THROUGH "10" MAY BE A CLASS 
A MISDEMEANOR. 
Petitioner is granted the following temporary relief (provisions "a" through "1") which will 
(expire/be reviewed by the court) 150 days from the date of this order: 
a. The Petitioner is granted custody of the following minor children: Breqne (age 71
 f 
Miquelle (age 5). Brighton (age 31 & Serena (age 1) HARDY 
b. Visitation shall be as follows: Standard schedule pursuant to ILC.A. SS 30-3-35 
c. The Respondent is restrained from using drugs and/or alcohol prior to or during 
visitation. 
d. The Respondent is restrained from removing the parties1 minor child/ren from the 
state of Utah. 
e. The Respondent is ordered to pay child support to the Petitioner in the amount of 
$ pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
f. The Respondent is ordered to participate in mandatory income withholding pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5. 
g. The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren1 s day care 
expenses. 
h. The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren1 s medical 
expenses including premiums, deductibles and co-payments. 
I. The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner spousal support in the amount of 
$ • 
j . The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner's medical expenses, suffered as a result 
of the abuse in the amount of $ . 
k. The Respondent is ordered to pay the minor child/renfs medical expenses, suffered 
as a result of the abuse in the amount of $ . 
1. Other 
Violation of provisions "a" through "1" may subject Respondent to contempt proceedings. 
11. The Division of Child and Family Services is ordered to conduct an investigation 
into the allegation of child abuse. 
12. Other: 
s* 
% /< 13. Law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the protected locations shall have 
authority to compel Respondent's compliance with this Order, including the authority to forcibly 
evict and restrain Respondent from the protected areas. Information to assist with identification 
of, the Respondent is attached to the Appendix to this Order. 
V N
^/ /1 y 14. Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that 
gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1976, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, the District of 
Columbia, tribal lands, and United States Territories. 
15. Three years after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss die 
remaining provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, the 
Petitioner should provide the court with a current address, which address will not be made 
available to Respondent. 
DATED: 
7T 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY^ 
OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURJ " 
LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAJ 
DATE 
-r^Mih 
DEPUTY COUPT C 
COURT: 
DISTRICf COURT 
Recommended by: 
.Oyu.> 
Date' / District Court Commissioner 
By this signature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts service, 
of this Protective Order and waives the right to be personally served. 
Respondent 
Serve Respondent at: 
\z; 
c 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintifl7Appellee, 
DALE DEMONT HARDY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case Nos. 9»1200873FS 
991200131FS 
PRELIMINARY HEARING JULY 12, 2000 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON 
ORIGINAL 
RbEG 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
AUG U 2 2001 
COURT OF APPEAL& 
MR. HEINEMAN: I mean, letters aren't just a one time 
thing intended for one point in time. People frequently save 
letters. Mr. Hardy was trying to preserve his thoughts and 
| feelings and things he wanted to convey to his children in 
letter form for them to have, for not only that time but also 
for the future. 
And as far as talking about their mother with the 
children, I mean, regardless of whether we think it's 
appropriate or not, I don't think it's a violation of the 
protective order. It's not a contact with the mother. It's 
not a solicitation for a third party to have contact with the 
mother on his behalf. And so it just isn't a violation. 
There's nothing in the contact order that says you can't ever 
mention the mother to your children. 
THE COURT: You know, and I agree, Mr. Heineman with 
about six-tenths of what you say. I mean, I think you're right 
on, I mean, I think he can talk about his mother or I mean 
their mother in letters to the kids. 
But Mr. Hardy, I think, any reasonable soul reading 
these letters and knowing the little we do about your children 
as described by your wife in response to these questions, would 
have to conclude that these letters were intended for an 
audience wider than that to which they were addressed. 
And that's an obtuse way of saying, it's clear to me 
you were writing to your wife, your ex-wife, Courtney Hardy. 
28 
1 And so for that reason I believe that the State's shown beyond 
2 a preponderance of the evidence in this case that you violated 
3 your plea in abeyance. And I believe they've shown probable 
4 cause to believe that you committed a violation of a protective 
5 order in this other case, the companion to it, and that there 
6 is sufficient grounds to believe that you committed the offense 
7 and you ought to be bound over for trial. 
8 So that's the order today. And I think it would be 
9 appropriate that we send all of this to Fratto because I 
10 believe the protective order, originally, is Fratto's case. It 
11 looks like his signature there. 
12 So Fratto will get to handle the - I mean I've made 
13 the determination that the violation's occurred but he'll 
14 handle the sentencing that should now be imposed on the 
15 misdemeanor. And then I guess we should take - I mean, the 
16 [inaudible] that comes to mind is now trial on the 31st, but 
17 J now, Mr. Heineman's suggestion that they all be done together 
18 is a thought but I don't know how anybody feels about that. Do 
19 you still want them all together? 
20 I mean we can hold these for a little while until the 
21 others catch up if they do. I don't know how that's done. I 
22 haven't really given that a lot of thought. 
23 MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, may I just make one 
24 argument and -
25 THE COURT: To keep it going separately? 
O Q 
